We study the evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks, focusing on the influence of different initial distributions for cooperators and defectors on the evolution of cooperation. To address this issue, we consider three types of initial distributions for defectors: uniform distribution at random, occupying the most connected nodes, and occupying the lowest-degree nodes, respectively. It is shown that initial configurations for defectors can crucially influence the cooperation level and the evolution speed of cooperation. Interestingly, the situation where defectors initially occupy the lowest-degree vertices can exhibit the most robust cooperation, compared with two other distributions. That is, the cooperation level is least affected by the initial percentage of defectors. Moreover, in this situation, the whole system evolves fastest to the prevalent cooperation. Besides, we obtain the critical values of initial frequency of defectors above which the extinction of cooperators occurs for the respective initial distributions. Our results might be helpful in explaining the maintenance of high cooperation in scale-free networks.
Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has become an important tool for investigating cooperative behavior of biological, ecological, social and economic systems [1, 2] . The Prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) is one of the most commonly employed games for this purpose. Originally, in the PDG, two individuals adopt one of the two available strategies, cooperate or defect; both receive R under mutual cooperation and P under mutual defection, while a cooperator receives S when confronted to a defector, which in turn receives T , where T > R > P > S and T + S < 2R. Under these conditions it is best to defect for rational individuals in a single round of the PDG, regardless of the opponent strategy. However, mutual cooperation would be preferable for both of individuals. Thus, the dilemma is caused by the selfishness of the individuals.
However, the unstable cooperative behavior is opposite to the observations in the real world. This disagreement thus motivates to find under what conditions the cooperation can emerge in the PDG [3] . Actually, in well-mixed populations, each individual interacts with each other. The average payoff of defectors is greater than the average payoff of cooperators and the frequency of cooperators asymptotically vanishes. Thus in order for the emergence of cooperation from PDG, other extensions to original PDG should be considered. In particular, placing players in vertices of a given network is such an extension to explore the role of population structure in the evolution of cooperation. That is, each individual occupies one vertex and only interacts with its immediate neighbors defined by a social net- work. Recently, several studies have reported various network effects on the evolution of cooperation in different model networks [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Nowak and May introduced a spatial evolutionary PDG model in which individuals located on a lattice play with their neighbors, and found that the spatial effect promotes substantially the emergence of cooperation [4] . Santos et al. studied the PDG and Snowdrift game (SG) on scale-free networks and found that comparing with the regular networks, scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation [7] . Notably, scale-free networks, where the degree distribution follows a power-law form, are highly heterogeneous, and the heterogeneity of the network structure can promote cooperation. Moreover, Santos and co-workers showed that connected large degree nodes constitute a key mechanism promoting cooperation in scale-free networks [7, 9, 10] . Very recently, Gómez-Gardeñes et al. explained the prevailing cooperation in scale-free networks from the dynamical organizations of cooperation, i.e., the unique cooperator core formed during the evolutionary process [11] . In addition, the role of initial condition in evolution of cooperation is also investigated extensively [12] .
In this Letter, we focus on the influence of different initial distributions for defectors and cooperators on evolution of cooperation in scale-free networks. To our best knowledge, most of previous works assumed that initially defectors and cooperators are uniformly distributed at random among the vertices of networks. However, it is interesting to investigate the situations where initially defectors are intentionally distributed among the nodes with largest (or lowest) degrees. More importantly, the effect of different initial frequencies of defectors cannot be neglected when different initial distributions of defectors are considered. Thus two questions naturally arise from this perspective: with the same initial frequency of defectors, which initial distribution of defectors will provide the most favorable "greenhouse" for cooperators to survive and dominate? Under the same initial distribution of defectors, will changing the initial frequency of defectors significantly affect the evolution of cooperation? In subsequent sections, we will discuss these two questions. We found that the situation where defectors initially occupy the lowest-degree vertices can exhibit the most robust cooperation, compared with two other distributions. Namely, the cooperation level is least affected by the initial percentage of defectors.
The rest of this Letter is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the evolutionary game model as well as the networks on which the evolution of cooperation is studied in detail. Simulation results and discussion are provided in Section 3. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
The model
Firstly, we construct scale-free networks using the Barabási and Albert model (BA) which is considered to be the typical model of the heterogeneous networks [13] . Starting from m 0 vertices which are connected to each other, at each time step one adds a new vertex with m (m m 0 ) edges that link the new vertex to m different vertices already present in the system. When choosing the vertices to which the new vertex connects, one assumes that the probability P i that a new vertex will be connected to vertex i depends on the degree k i of vertex i: P i = k i / j k j . After t time steps this algorithm produces a graph with N = t + m 0 vertices and mt edges. Here, we set m = m 0 = 2 and network size N = 3000 for all the simulations. Thus, the average degree of this network model can be given as k = 2m = 4.
After constructing networks, each site of the network is occupied by an individual. Each individual who is a pure strategist can only follow two simple strategies: cooperate (C) and defect (D). In one generation, each individual plays a PDG with its neighbors simultaneously, and collects payoffs dependent on the payoff matrix parameters. The total payoff of a certain individual is the sum over all interactions in one generation. Following common practice [4, 7, 14] , we use a simplified version of PDG, and make T = b, R = 1 and P = S = 0, where b represents the advantage of defectors over cooperators, being typically constrained to the interval 1 < b < 2. Therefore, we can rescale the game just depending on the single parameter b. Let us represent the individuals' strategies with twocomponent vectors, taking the value s = (1, 0) T for C-strategist and s = (0, 1) T for D-strategist. Accordingly, the total payoff P x of a certain individual x can be written as
where the sum runs over all the neighboring sites of x (this set is indicated by Ω x ), and A is the payoff matrix of PDG and can be written as
During the evolutionary process, each individual is allowed to learn from one of its neighbors and update its strategy in each generation. Following previous works [14, 15] , each individual chooses one co-player randomly from its neighbors. After choosing a neighbor y, the individual x adopts the selected neighbor y's strategy in the next generation with a probability depending on their total payoff difference as
where K characterizes the noise effects, including fluctuations in payoffs, errors in decision, individual trials, etc. [14] . And P x , P y denote the total payoffs of individual x and y, respectively. Here, K is set to 0.125. Furthermore, we have checked that the results remained qualitatively unaffected for other values of K.
Simulations and discussion
In the following, we will show the simulation results carried out for a population of N = 3000 individuals occupying the vertices of scale-free networks withk = 4. The above model is simulated with synchronous updating. Indeed, the system can converge to an absorbing state eventually, whereas the time for reaching an absorbing state may be prohibitively large [16, 17] . In our simulations, we wait until the system relaxes to the absorbing state and compute the fraction of times that evolution stopped at 100% cooperators. However, if the system has not converged to an absorbing state after a transient time of 11 000 generations, we take as the final result the average frequency of cooperators by averaging over the last 1000 generations. Moreover, we have confirmed that averaging over larger periods or using different transient times did not qualitatively change the simulation results.
In what follows, three situations of initial distributions for cooperators and defectors will be considered: (1) defectors are randomly distributed to occupy the network vertices [situation (1) thereafter]; (2) defectors on purpose occupy the most connected nodes [situation (2)]; (3) defectors are intentionally assigned to occupy the nodes with the least degrees [situation (3)]. In these three respective situations, the effects of different initial frequencies of defectors f ID on the emergence of cooperation are subsequently investigated. In situations (2) [situation (3)], nodes in the scale-free networks are sorted by decreasing (increasing) number of links that each node contains. There are instances where groups of nodes contain identical numbers of links. Where this occurs, they are arbitrarily assigned a position within that groups. For example, the node rank r denotes the position of a node on this ordered list and 1 r N [18] . Initially, when r defectors occupy the most connected nodes, they just occupy the r nodes with highest connectivity in the networks; while r defectors occupy the nodes with the least degrees, they just occupy the r nodes with smallest connectivity in the networks. f ID = r/N thus can be denoted as the initial frequency of defectors. Herein, the frequencies of cooperators at final stage as a function of b and f ID for different initial distributions have been computed. To this end, each data point results from an average over 60 realizations, corresponding to 6 different network model realizations with 10 runs of independent initial strategy configurations for each realization. Fig. 1 shows the simulation results in contour plot forms for different initial distributions. Clearly, in Fig. 1(a) it is found that the cooperation level ρ c becomes poorer when f ID increases for fixed b. Specially, the cooperation level begins to fluctuate and decreases intensively when f ID is near one for high values of b. We can see cooperators dominate over the most ranges of b and f ID in this situation. In Fig. 1(b) , cooperation strongly depends on the value of f ID , and defectors dominate over the most ranges of b and f ID . In Fig. 1(c) , a certain amount of cooperation level can emerge and remain stable even for large value of f ID . Thus in situation (3), cooperators prevail over the most ranges of b and f ID . Further, it is clear that in Figs. 1(a), (b) , and (c), the cooperation levels at final stage corresponding to situations (1), (2) , and (3) are different from each other, especially for large values of b and f ID . Besides, for the same b and f ID , the cooperation level of situation (3) is highest among the three aforementioned situations. A comparison of evolution of cooperation for different values of f ID is shown in Fig. 2 , in which we depict the cooperation level as a function of the parameter b. In Fig. 2(a) , it is observed that ρ c decreases rapidly for increasing value of b when f ID approaches one, while the cooperation level remains stable for small values of b and f ID . Additionally, when f ID approaches one, it is extremely difficult for cooperators to survive in such harsh environment. As a result, the cooperation level is relatively low for large f ID . As shown in Fig. 2(b) , cooperation is extraordinarily inhibited as b increases in situation (2), especially for large value of f ID . It is found that cooperation is quite sensitive to the initial condition f ID because situation (2) makes the defectors more advantageous over cooperators. Moreover, cooperators die out when f ID is more than 50% no matter what the value of b is. Fig. 2 (c) exhibits robust and favorable cooperation for different values of f ID . Even if a small number of cooperators initially occupy the rich nodes, it still leads to a high cooperation level. The frequency of cooperators decreases slowly for large f ID over the whole region of b. In other words, the cooperative behavior is robust against defector's invasion in this situation. From Fig. 2 , we should point out that under the same initial frequency of defectors f ID , different initial distributions for cooperators and defectors can crucially influence the evolution of cooperation; and also, with the same initial distribution, changing the initial frequency of defectors f ID will to a certain extent affect the cooperation level at final stage. Furthermore, in comparison with the two other situations, situation (3) where defectors occupy the least connected nodes (i.e., cooperators occupy the rich nodes), presents much more robust cooperation in this respect that high cooperation remains for almost any temptation.
The time evolution of cooperation in PDG for different values of b and initial distributions with the same f ID is presented in Fig. 3 . It is found that situation (3) makes the system converge fastest to the state of 100% cooperators in the three situations, while situation (2) where defectors firstly occupy the nodes with highest connectivity provides much harsher condition for the emergence of cooperation than the two other situations and makes cooperation level drop much fast. Situation (3) promotes the emergence of cooperation and can speed up the evolution of cooperation. Hence, the initial distribution not only plays a crucial role in the evolution direction of the whole system, but also significantly affects the evolution speed toward to cooperation. In order to explore the role of initial frequency of defectors, f ID , in the evolution of cooperation, we further detect the critical value of f ID , above which the cooperators vanish finally corresponding to the three respective situations. The corresponding result is provided in Fig. 4 . We can see that for an arbitrary value of b, the critical frequency of defectors in situation (3) is always higher than those in situations (1) and (2) . Consequently, these results also reflect the fact-situation (3) provides much more favorable and robust cooperation against to the intensive invasion of defectors. In what follows, we will provide some qualitative explanations for these simulation results. In BA scale-free networks, the large-degree nodes are generally very well connected to each other, while there are few direct links between the small-degree vertices (as illustrated in Figs. 5(a) and (b) ). The connectivity structure between these hubs in the networks can be crucial for the emergence of cooperation [7, 9, 10, 19, 20] . These rich nodes could be viewed as the "network core", similar with the "cooperator core" in Ref. [11] . Once cooperators occupy this core, it is hard for defectors to fight back and cooperation prevails in the network as a result of the influence of hubs to small-degree nodes. To validate this scenario, we investigate the time evolution of fraction of cooperators among these network hubs. In Fig. 6 , we can see that the type of players which occupy the network core, i.e., hubs, will exclusively affect the evolution direction of the whole network. Obviously, in situation (2) where the core is initially occupied by defectors, cooperators have no chance to beat the defectors occupying the hubs; in situation (3) where the core is initially occupied by cooperators, cooperators are robust and favorable when confronted the invasion of peripheral defectors. Most interestingly, in situation (1) where defectors and cooperators are initially uniformly distributed among these hubs, cooperators are more capable to take advantage of hubs in which cooperators nearly occupy all the hubs. Moreover, the fraction of cooperators among the "core" shows some kind of "truncated equilibrium" behavior-the core is occasionally invaded by few defectors, but cooperators are so competent to fight back that the core recovers to full cooperation. These results also elucidate the underlying mechanism of high cooperation level discovered in scale-free networks.
Now we make further discussion on the simulation results. First, we discuss evolution of cooperation in situation (1) with different values of f ID . When f ID is small, nodes with high connectivity will be occupied by defectors with much smaller probability. In this case, individuals using strategy C occupying highly connected nodes communicate with each other and form main cluster structures in the network core, and hence the high levels of cooperation can emerge. Nonetheless, the probability, with which cooperators initially occupy the most connected vertices, decreases with increasing f ID . Then cooperators may be exiled from the network core during the evolutionary process, but there are still some fragmental clusters for cooperators to survive based upon "feeding each other". In this state there is a systematic drop of cooperation at the beginning, nevertheless it tends to recover again in the long run, thereby, though cooperation falls, it could remain at a relatively favorable level. While f ID exceeds the critical frequency, it is still likely for a small number of C players to occupy the nodes with high connectivity, however, this probability is so small, since strategies C and D are randomly distributed among all the players. Accordingly, when f ID approaches one, it becomes increasingly difficult for the cooperators occupying most connected nodes to help each other in this state and be suppressed eventually. Thus, as for situation (1), as long as the initial frequency of defectors does not exceed the critical value, the cooperation level is just to a certain extent affected by the value of f ID . Moreover, this discrepancy could be neglected at most times when the initial conditions f ID are not deviated from each other too much, just as in much previous works [7, 9] .
In the following, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in situation (2) , where cooperators initially occupy vertices having only a few links. In Fig. 5(b) , it shows that there are few actual links among half of the nodes which are almost the least connected nodes. When f ID is more than 50% in situation (2), it is not possible to form network clusters for cooperators where cooperators can help each other, and defectors are grouped in the network core, then cooperators lose more and more elements along with the increment of evolution generations, therefore, cooperators cannot survive no matter what the value of b is. Nevertheless, only small isolated pieces can be formed for cooperators to avoid dying out when f ID is less than the critical frequency, since defectors occupy the most connected nodes. Therefore, it results in that cooperation falls intensively and cannot remain stable. However, a high level of cooperation is sustainable just for small values of b, because in this case defectors have not much advantage over cooperators. For b ∼ 1, cooperators are equivalent to defectors, then the level of cooperation is not strongly sensitive to the initial distribution for cooperators and defectors. In fact, for small values of b in situation (2), cooperation falls rapidly at the beginning, and then cooperators sometimes can recover but not always. For large b, cooperation always falls and never recovers. Therefore, in situation (2) cooperation drops rapidly and it needs much time to revert cooperation if cooperation can recover finally. Accordingly, cooperators vanish over the most regions of b and f ID in this situation where the environment for cooperators to survive is extremely harsh.
The evolution of cooperation in situation (3) is analyzed finally. In this case, it is easy for cooperators to form giant compact network clusters, starting from occupying the network core. Even if a small number of cooperators occupy the most connected nodes at the beginning, compact clusters for cooperators can be formed during the evolutionary process. Conversely, defectors are not as capable of taking advantage of hubs as cooperators, because most of the network core is occupied by cooperators, and cooperators can feed each other to beat back the intensive invasion of defectors (see Fig. 6 ). The presence of well-connected hubs (network core) in the connectivity structure of scale-free networks for cooperators sustains the high level of cooperation even for large values of b. Besides, situation (3) can favor cooperation at the beginning, and makes the system reach the favorable cooperation level very fast. Therefore, cooperators dominate over the entire ranges of b and f ID , and the cooperative behavior is robust against defectors' invasion in this situation.
Scale-free networks have most of their connectivity clustered in a few nodes, and also the large-degree vertices are well linked to each other, consisting of a "network core". The type of players who occupy the network core is essential to the evolution of cooperation. Therefore, initial distributions for cooperators and defectors can affect the cooperative behavior and the evolution speed of cooperation. The situation where cooperators initially occupy the most connected nodes, presents the much more robust cooperation and can speed up the evolution of cooperation, in comparison with the two other ones. Moreover, cooperators can prevail by forming network clusters, where they can assist each other. These results are independent of the size of the populations N .
Conclusions
In summary, we have studied the cooperative behavior of the evolutionary PDG on scale-free networks for different initial distributions, and also found that the presence of network core and clusters for cooperators can favor cooperation. Cooperators dominate over the most range of b with different initial frequencies of defectors in situation (1); a poor and unstable cooperation level can be presented in situation (2); while a very favorable and robust cooperation level can be exhibited in situation (3) . The latter provides the most robust cooperation in the three situations. Additionally, it is found that situation (3) can speed up the evolution of cooperation; while situation (2) makes cooperation drop fast and recover difficultly. And the critical frequencies of defectors for cooperators to vanish corresponding to different initial distributions have been respectively obtained. Some qualitative explanations based on the properties of scale-free networks are provided for these phenomena. Therefore, our results show that initial configurations for cooperators and defectors with different ratios of defectors at the beginning can affect the levels of cooperation on heterogeneous networks. Moreover, our work may be helpful in exploring the roots of cooperative behavior on heterogeneous networks.
